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The manipulationist account of causation provides a conceptual analysis of
cause-effect relationships in terms of hypothetical experiments. It also explains
why and how experiments are used for the empirical testing of causal claims.
This paper attempts to apply the manipulationist account of causation to a broader
range of experiments—a range that extends beyond experiments explicitly
designed for the testing of causal claims. I aim to show (1) that the set of causal
inferences afforded by an experiment is determined solely on the basis of
contrasting case structures that I call “experimental series”, and (2) that the
conditions that suffice for causal inference obtain quite commonly, even among
“ordinary” experiments that are not explicitly designed for the testing of causal
claims.
1. Introduction. The manipulationist account of causation, exemplified especially in the
work of Woodward (2003), is a powerful and interesting explication of the meaning of causal
claims. The account is intended as a conceptual clarification of what it is to be a causal
relationship, and it provides this clarification by making reference to hypothetical experiments
and ideal interventions. And since, according to the account, hypothetical experiments are
embedded in the very content of causal claims, it requires only a small logical step to explain
the role of experimentation in the empirical investigation of causal claims.
No one can deny that some scientists intend to test causal claims, and that they design and
carry out experiments for the purpose. Does the type of fertilizer applied to potatoes affect
crop yield? A scientist might perform an experiment by applying different types and
quantities of fertilizer and comparing the resulting yield. Does a certain drug improve
prognosis for patients with a certain condition? A group of scientists might perform a series
of randomized, double-blind trials to find out. The manipulationist account certainly seems to
be applicable for analyzing the success or failure of causal inference in experiments such as
these. However, it is not quite as easy to see if—or how—the manipulationist account might
apply to experiments that are not explicitly designed or carried out for the purpose of testing a
causal claim.
Experiments in the physical sciences, in particular, rarely seem to be framed in terms of
causal questions, at least not explicit ones. Consider an experiment aimed at measuring the
boiling temperature of nitric acid at atmospheric pressure. Is such an experiment intended to
test a causal claim? It certainly doesn’t seem so, at least not at first glance. But could the
experiment still afford causal inference, if we knew where to look and what assumptions to
apply? I take the answer to this latter question to be non-obvious, and the goal of this paper is
to make some progress toward an answer.
This paper attempts to apply the manipulationist account of causation to a broader range
of experiments—a range that extends beyond the set of experiments that are explicitly
designed for the testing of causal claims. I wish to include anything that we might naturally
call an “experiment”—i.e., a scientific study in which the investigator deliberately sets up
and/or intervenes on a system for the purpose of studying it.1 I aim to show (1) that the set of
causal inferences afforded by an experiment is determined solely on the basis of contrasting
case structures that I call “experimental series”, and (2) that the conditions that suffice for
causal inference obtain quite commonly, even among “ordinary” experiments that are not
explicitly designed for the testing of causal claims.
The implications of this point are potentially far-reaching. Even experiments not branded
as “causal”, including those carried out in the course of research in the physical sciences, can,
under certain circumstances, afford causal inference. As a result, an experiment that meets
certain criteria has the ability to furnish causal content even in those areas of science (e.g.,
fundamental physics) where causal content is less obvious.
2. The Manipulationist Account of Causation. I begin with a brief overview of the
manipulationist account of causation. The manipulationist account, in its most basic form, is
intended as an account of the meaning of causal claims. A meaningful causal claim must have
an interpretation that refers to the result of some relevant hypothetical experiment. But what is
the relevant hypothetical experiment for a given causal claim? Roughly, the idea is the
following: for a causal claim such as “X causes Y ”, the hypothetical experiment under
1Purely observational studies (e.g., observing astronomical events through a telescope,
analyzing retrospective health information, etc.) that involve no intervention or set-up on the
part of the investigator will not be considered experiments for my purposes here.
consideration is one in which the variable or factor X is manipulated or changed in some way,
and any corresponding change (or non-change) in Y is observed. According to the
manipulationist account of causation, consideration of such an experiment is logically
embedded in the very content of a well-formed causal claim, such that evaluation of the truth
or falsity of the claim will be tied to an evaluation of whether or not a change in X would be
seen if the experiment were to be performed.
We can state the idea more formally as a criterion for X to be considered a cause of Y :
MANIPULATIONIST CAUSE: X is a cause2 of Y iff, under some set of background
conditions BC = {BC1, BC2, . . . , BCn} having values {bc1, bc2, . . . , bcn}, given some
(possibly empty) set S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} of variables other than X and Y that are
held fixed at predetermined values {s1, s2, . . . , sm}, there is some ideal intervention3 I
on X that would change the value of Y .
2
“Cause”, as I use it here and throughout this paper, corresponds to Woodward’s
“type-level contributing cause”. The criterion that I give here is a modified and simplified
version of Woodward’s M, which requires detailed knowledge of the path from X to Y (see
Woodward (2003, 59)). In the context of my discussion here, I do not wish to assume that an
evaluator of causal claims always has that knowledge, and so I give a criterion that does not
require it. In addition, my criterion is intended to be more faithful to the implicit criterion for
causation in the mind of an actual experimenter who is—implicitly or explicitly—testing a
causal claim.
3The manipulationist account requires that an intervention variable have particular
characteristics in relation to both X and Y and the larger system of variables being considered.
For the purpose of brevity, I will not discuss these requirements here; see Woodward (2003).
According to the above criterion, a hypothetical experiment relevant to the evaluation of
the claim “X is a cause of Y ” is one in which we hold some (possibly empty) set of variables
S fixed while intervening on X , and we observe any associated changes in the value of Y . The
claim “X is a cause of Y ” will be true if and only if changes would be observed in Y in the
context of some hypothetical experiment defined by a specific BC, S, and I .
An important thing to note about this way of spelling out the meaning of a causal claim is
that it makes use of a particular kind of counterfactual claim. In order to make sense of how
an intervention on one variable, X , “makes a difference” to another variable, Y , we need to
have some concept of what would have happened had the intervention on X not occurred. It
is only by comparing the case in which the intervention is performed with our background
understanding of what would have happened had the intervention not been performed (or had
a different intervention been performed) that we get a sense of an effect.
A second thing to notice about the hypothetical experiment referenced by a causal claim is
that it involves two different types of interactions with the experimental system. The values of
the background condition variables in BC are observed, as is the value of Y . Nothing is done
to directly force these variables to take on particular values. For X and for the set S, however,
interventions directly force these variables to take on certain values.4 The distinction between
observing the value of certain variables and intervening to set the value of others is absolutely
central to the manipulationist account of causation. The character of the knowledge that we
4Experiments with a non-empty S will be multiple-intervention experiments intended for
ruling out “unfaithfulness”, as it is called in the causal modeling literature. In cases of
unfaithfulness, observational data (and even some experimental data) can make it appear that
two variables are independent of one another despite one being a cause of the other. See
Spirtes et al. (2000, 13–14), Woodward (2003, 49–50), and Zhang and Spirtes (2008).
gain from observing a natural course of events in a system and that of the knowledge that we
can gain from carefully designed interventions on that same system are essentially different.
When we know from mere observation that certain values of X are associated with certain
values of Y , this fact underdetermines the various types of causal connections that might exist
between the two variables. Assuming that the correlation is not a spurious result of sample or
selection bias, there are three different ways in which the variables might be causally
connected: (i) X could be a cause of Y , (ii) Y could be a cause of X , and/or (iii) X and Y
could share a common cause (or set of common causes). Interventions allow us to distinguish
among these three types of causal connections (and their several combinations), because each
kind of causal connection between X and Y would respond differently to interventions on X
or Y .
3. From Hypothetical Experiment to Real Experiment. The conceptual tools and criteria
discussed in the previous section serve the primary goal of the manipulationist account of
causation: that of explicating and interpreting causal claims in terms of hypothetical
experiments. Given a causal claim, these tools allow us to reconstruct the relevant
hypothetical experiment embedded in the claim (or a set of relevant hypothetical experiments
that reflect alternate interpretations of the claim).
Although the conceptual interpretation of causal claims is the primary goal of the
manipulationist account, the manipulationist account of causation carries with it an important
corollary for scientific practice. For those who wish not only to evaluate the content of a
causal claim but moreover to test its truth, the manipulationist account can provide norms and
recommendations for experimental testing. The truth or falsity of a causal claim can be
empirically tested as long the hypothetical experiment embedded in the content of the claim
can be actually realized. Actual experiments intended to test a causal claim can—and
should—be modeled on the hypothetical experiment suggested in the content of the causal
claim.
Let us focus on how an actual experiment must be carried out if it is to test a causal claim:
EXPERIMENTAL INSTANCE FOR TESTING THE CLAIM “X IS A CAUSE OF Y ”: Under
some set of background conditions BC = {BC1, BC2, . . . , BCn} having values
{bc1, bc2, . . . , bcn}, hold some set S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} of variables other than X and
Y fixed at values {s1, s2, . . . , sm}, perform an intervention I on X , and observe the
value of Y .
The above operation, however, is only a single instance of an experiment and is
insufficient for answering the question “Is X a cause of Y ?” Recall that the hypothetical
experiment embodied in the claim that X causes Y makes use of a contrast between two
counterfactual states: the state of Y when X is manipulated in one way, and the state of Y if
X had been manipulated in a different way (or not at all). But actual experiments provide us
no access to such counterfactual knowledge.
The obvious way to estimate the results of counterfactual experimental instances is to test
many instances of the experimental system under similar conditions and to use statistical
analysis5 to estimate the expected response of the system under different interventions. Let us
define for this purpose an experimental series:
5Statistical analysis, as I intend it here, could be as simple as calculating a mean and
standard deviation from the set of measured results, or could involve the application of much
more sophisticated analysis techniques.
EXPERIMENTAL SERIES FOR TESTING THE CLAIM “X IS A CAUSE OF Y ”: A set of
two or more experimental instances for testing the claim “X is a cause of Y ” such that:
1. Every instance in the set has the same (or sufficiently similar) values for BC and
S; and
2. The set can be partitioned into two or more non-empty subsets such that every
instance in each subset has the same value for the intervention I on X and no two
instances falling into different subsets have the same value for the intervention I
on X .
Observations made of the value of Y for each of the subsets described in item 2 above can
be collated and used to generate a statistical estimate of the expected value of Y under the
type of intervention used in that subset of experimental instances. If there is a significant
difference in the expected values of Y for different subsets, then we may conclude that X is a
cause of Y . If there is not a significant difference in the expected value of Y for different
subsets, the conclusion must be more tentative. If a sufficient number of instances has been
tested, we can legitimately conclude only that X is not a cause of Y under the particular
circumstances of the experiment (where “circumstances” includes the background conditions
BC, the choice of S on which to perform secondary interventions, and the range of values of
X that were effectively tested in the series). The possibility that X will manifest itself as a
cause of Y under other circumstances remains open, but the likelihood of that possibility can
be reduced by testing of other series with different values for BC, different values for S,
and/or interventions testing differing ranges of values of X .
4. From Real Experiments to Causal Claims. We have already discussed the way in which
a real experiment can approximate the hypothetical experiment embedded in a causal claim.
Now I would like to turn our attention to experiments that are not explicitly concerned with
causation or the testing of causal claims. When analyzing an experiment that was not designed
for the purpose of testing causal claims, we simply seek to identify anything that could be
properly described as an experimental series (on the definition given in the previous section).
Consider as an example an experiment performed by Gasparo Berti, which aimed to
decide a philosophical controversy surrounding the possibility of a vacuum and test Galileo’s
predictions about the maximum height to which water could be raised by suction. The
experiment was most likely carried out sometime in the years 1642–1643 in the company of
several active participants in the scientific scene of Rome, including Raffaello Magiotti,
Athanasius Kircher, and Niccolo` Zucchi. A description of the experiment is found in a 1648
letter from Magiotti to Marin Mersenne. The following is an excerpt from the letter:
In regard to the history of quicksilver, you may know that the many wells of Florence,
which are cleaned each year by suction with siphons, gave Sig. Galileo the opportunity
to observe the height of the attraction which was always the same, about 18 Tuscan
braccia,6 and that in every siphon or cylinder, no matter how wide or thin. This was the
origin of his speculations on the subject in his work on the cohesion of solids.
Later, Sig. Gasparo Berti, here in Rome, made a lead siphon that stretched about 22
braccia from his courtyard to his room, and was filled from above in the following way.
First, leaving both valves open (D below and F above), vessel AG was filled with water.
[See figure 1.] Then, after closing valve D, the water of vessel AGPM was poured out
6The braccio was equivalent to slightly more than half of a meter.
Figure 1: Diagram of Berti’s experiment, included in Magiotti’s letter to Mersenne
(through valve M), leaving the water inside the siphon at height AE. Later, making sure
to keep vessel HF full,7 the water AE was allowed to flow out through valve D, which
(since valve F was already open and immersed in water) pulled the water from above
and filled the whole siphon BA and the vessel AG. Finally, with vessel HF full and
having closed valve F, and with vessel AG full (having first closed M) and D open, the
water started to descend through the siphon, emptying the entire neck BF. The water
continued to fall until reaching N and did not descend further, but almost always
balanced itself [at N] when the experience was replicated. And it was possible to
observe this very well, since part BC of the siphon was made of glass on purpose and
the whole siphon was well glued and watertight. Sig. Berti believed that he could refute
Sig. Galileo with this experience, saying that the length from N to A was more than 18
7This was presumably done by continuous refilling.
braccia, but he should have seen that the piece of the siphon AE doesn’t count, being
immersed in the water of vessel AG; EN was 18 braccia exactly.
I should not fail to mention one thing that gave me much to think about: while the
water of the siphon was falling and the neck BF was emptying, an infinite number of
tiny bubbles, like those in glasses and crystals, could be seen rising through the water
inside the glass BC: this, without a doubt, was some stuff that went to refill where the
air was missing. I could not convince myself that it was air because there was not
enough air in the water in vessel AG to refill that space (besides, the space NBF could
be made much larger and it would still refill). Nor could air have entered through pores
or the welding of the siphon, for if it had, it would have eventually allowed the
suspended water to fall. In fact, those bubbles have always remained in my mind: I can
only explain my whole sentiment about them briefly like that.8
Besides Magiotti’s letter, there are four other sources that describe Berti’s experiment: two
written by eyewitnesses Zucchi and Kircher, and two other secondary sources.9 These other
accounts all describe a similar and slightly more complex version of the experiment, which
may have been a later modification. In this version, a glass globe was mounted on the siphon
(see figure 2). The globe contained a bell attached to a magnetic device so that, once the
purported vacuum was achieved inside the globe, the bell could be rung from outside by using
another magnet.
The primary intention of the experiment, at least on Berti’s part, appears to have been a
desire to check (and perhaps refute) Galileo’s prediction of 18 braccia. A secondary intention
8Translation mine. The manuscript of the letter is published in de Waard (1936, 178–181).
9de Waard (1936) contains relevant excerpts (in the original Latin) from all four sources.
Figure 2: Engraving of a more complex version of Berti’s experiment, reproduced in Schott
(1664/1687, 203)
was to investigate the empty space itself: was it or was it not a vacuum? It is obvious from
Magiotti’s letter that this latter was a question of interest for him, and it was likely the most
important question in the minds of the other participants as well; Zucchi and Kircher were
both Jesuits who were convinced of the impossibility of the vacuum.
The addition of the bell in the more complex version of the experiment was suggested by
Kircher and intended as an experimentum crucis to test the claim that the space in the globe
was a vacuum. The space was found to transmit both light and magnetism, and the bell could
indeed be heard when rung. These facts were enough to convince both Zucchi and Kircher,
and perhaps also Berti, that the space was not a vacuum. Maignan, a friend of Berti’s and a
later commentator on the experiment, proposed the counter-opinion that the sound of the bell
was being conducted by the bell’s wooden support rather than by the space itself, and argued
that the space was indeed a vacuum. It seems that Magiotti remained uncertain. Inasmuch as
the various participants walked away from the experiment with different views, the
experimentum crucis was a failure.
Notice that the questions of interest for those performing and attending the Berti
experiment were not causal questions; none of the writings explicitly mention a curiosity
about the cause of the empty space, for example, nor is there any evidence of debate among
the participants about what caused the elevation of the water to be 18 braccia rather than
some other height. The questions posed and debated were, instead, factual questions and
questions of interpretation about the phenomenon: How high did the water stand? Could there
be any pores or imperfections in the device? Did the space transmit sound? Was the space a
vacuum, or was it not?
Despite the lack of interest in causal questions on the part of those involved in the
experiment, can causal conclusions can be drawn anyway? A first step toward deciding this
question is to itemize the procedure described in the excerpt from Magiotti’s letter and
classify each step as an intervention component (I) or an observation component (O):
1. (I) Construct and set up the pipe and vessels in the configuration given in figure 1.
Ensure that valve M is closed.
2. (I) Open valves D and F.
3. (I) Fill vessel AG with water.
4. (I) Open valve M.
5. (O) Observe that vessel AG empties. Water inside the siphon remains at height AE.
6. (I) Fill vessel HF with water.
7. (I) Open valve D and continue supplying HF with water.
8. (O) Observe that the water flows out through valve D and also flows from above to fill
siphon.
9. (I) Close valve F and valve M.
10. (O) Observe that the water begins to descend down the siphon, emptying neck BF and
falling until it reaches N.
Assuming a similar set-up for the more complex version of the experiment,10 we might
simply modify the first step and add several steps to the end of the procedure:
1*. (I) Construct pipe mounted with glass globe and internal magnet-bell apparatus.




11. (O) Observe that light passes through the sphere.
12. (I) Move magnet around the exterior of the glass globe.
13. (O) Observe that the interior magnet moves in response to the exterior magnet’s
movement.
14. (O) Observe that sound can be heard from the bell inside the glass sphere.
It is interesting to notice that many—not just one—of the steps listed in the above
procedures are interventions on the experimental system. Most of them serve only as steps
toward the set-up of the apparatus. However, each can, in principle, be considered as an
intervention in an experimental instance for testing a variety of causal claims; the variable X
will be the thing intervened upon (for example, the intervention in step 4 is an intervention on
whether or not valve M is open), the variable Y can be any observation that follows (for
example, the observation in step 5 that vessel AG empties), and all other observations and
10Other accounts of the experiment describe a different procedure for filling the apparatus
with water, but the difference in procedure is inconsequential for the analysis I offer below.
interventions involved in the experiment are considered either as observed background
conditions in BC or auxiliary interventions in S.
The question of whether or not the experiment affords causal inference amounts to the
question of whether or not the various experimental instances that make up the experiment are
part of an identifiable experimental series. Consider, for example, an experimental instance
centered around the intervention in step 4 above. The variable X might represent the state of
valve M (open or closed) and the variable Y might represent the state of the vessel AG (which
can be empty or full, but is observed as empty in step 5). The set-up established in steps 1–3
and other background conditions surrounding the experiment could all be represented by the
set BC. Now, if we can identify at least one other experimental instance with the exact same
values for BC but a different intervention on valve M, we will have identified an experimental
series for testing the claim that the state of valve M is a cause of the vessel AG emptying.
Berti’s experiment does in fact provide such an experimental instance. Assuming that there is
some time lapse between the execution of steps 3 and 4, we can consider as a second
experimental instance the time period after steps 1–3 have been performed but before valve M
has been opened. In this time period, vessel AG is observed to be full. Since there is a
difference in the state of vessel AG between the experimental instance in which M is opened
and the experimental instance in which M is not opened, we can conclude that the state of
valve M is a cause of the state of vessel AG.
The observation-intervention pair considered in the example experimental series just given
(i.e., a valve being opened and a vessel emptying) are such an ordinary matter of course that
we do not tend to think of it as the basis for a causal conclusion that can be drawn from the
experiment. That water only empties from a vessel that has some open outlet is a mundane
fact that each person experiences so many times in life that it becomes an implicit piece of
causal knowledge. Still, inasmuch as the experiment establishes a contrast between
performing and not performing an intervention (or alternatively, performing one type of
intervention vs. performing a different type of intervention) and the corresponding difference
in the observations made in each case, the experiment also affords the conclusion that one
variable (the variable intervened upon) causes another (the variable observed to covary with
the variable intervened upon).
But are there more substantial causal questions that could have been answered by the
experiment in question? The interventions performed in the more complex version of the
experiment, if compared to a relevant contrast case, could be interpreted as tests of causal
questions. For example, when it is observed in step 11 that light passes through the spherical
glass vessel, the implicit contrast case is whether or not light passes through the spherical
glass vessel when it was originally filled with ordinary air. Presumably there were no
noticeable differences between the appearance of images viewed through the vessel in the two
cases. Likewise, we might compare the intervention in step 12 when it is performed in the
context of the experimental set-up and when it is performed in a contrasting context (for
example, with a column of water filling the siphon up to mark N, but not brought about
through suction, so that the spherical glass vessel is filled with ordinary air).
The participants in the experiment were not, however, thinking in terms of these
contrasting experimental instances. Even if they had been, they would have been unable to
agree on a causal conclusion because they were unable to agree about what the interventions
in the experiment had achieved. It is clear in Berti’s experiment what the intervention is (or
rather, what the sequence of interventions is: steps 1–4, 6–7, 9, 12) but what those
interventions achieve was precisely the subject of debate. Some of the participants—the
vacuists—thought that those interventions achieved a vacuum in the spherical vessel, while
others—the plenists—thought that the vessel was still filled with some sort of attenuated
matter. If they had been able to agree, for example, that there was a vacuum in the vessel, then
they might have been able to agree that ordinary air (as opposed to vacuum) was not a cause
of the transmission of light or magnetism. In addition, they would have been able to reach a
conclusion about the effect of the vacuum on the transmission of sound by noting any
difference in the volume of the bell’s ring in each case.
But there was no such agreement. Instead, some of the participants were already certain,
prior to the experiment, that a vacuum could not transmit light or sound or magnetic
phenomena. They took themselves to be certain of the causal relationships, and they
attempted to test the presence or absence of the vacuum by the presence or absence of its
purported effects. An experiment which could have been understood to test various causal
claims instead used a prior confidence in those causal claims to test whether or not the cause
factor was present. Even so, the actual theoretical use to which the experiment was originally
put does not prevent anyone who is later informed of the details of the experiment from
drawing causal conclusions.
5. Conclusion. Many experiments that are not designed for the purpose of causal inference
will still afford causal inferences. The requirements I have placed on an experimental series
for testing a causal claim will be found quite commonly in “ordinary” scientific experiments.
We can see that this is true especially when we consider that, in cases where there is a time
lapse between the set-up of the experiment and the intervention on the purported cause
variable (if the time latency of the observed result is small in comparison to the time lapse), a
comparison of observations made before and after the intervention is performed will usually
correspond to an experimental series for testing if the variable intervened on is a cause of the
subsequent observation.
Interestingly, the fact that many “ordinary” experiments will afford causal inference
means that any experimental science has a plentiful source of causal content. I see this
unacknowledged point as significant to debates about whether or not there is causal content in
fundamental physics.11 In acknowledging the epistemic dependence of fundamental physics
on experiment, we must also acknowledge at least a potential for causal content.
11For a set of papers in this debate, see the volume edited by Price and Corry (2007).
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